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When second-year law students ask me why they should take the third-year 
course in Federal Courts, I usually tell them that it’s a capstone course—one 
that deepens their understanding of the building-block classes they’ve already 
taken.  My reference is to courses in Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, 
Civil Procedure, Employment Discrimination, Labor Law, Admiralty, and 
other federal-law-related topics.  And to prove my point, I pose two questions.  
First, from their understanding of Erie,1 is there federal common law?  And 
second, does the U.S. Supreme Court ever have the power to decide the 
meaning of state law, contrary to the decision of the state high court from 
which an appeal is taken?  Ninety-five percent of the responses to both 
questions are “No.”  So when I tell them there is indeed federal common law2 
and that the U.S. Supreme Court may reverse a state court’s decision on the 
meaning of its own law,3 I invariably am assured of a few more students for 
next year’s federal courts class. 
I.  TRENDS ON THE SUPREME COURT AND IN CONGRESS 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided several cases which have 
given new meaning to the terms “federalism”—respect for the states; and 
“separation of powers”—respect for a co-equal branch of the federal 
 
* Callis Family Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  This article is dedicated 
to Paul J. Mishkin, who taught me Federal Courts in law school and who, in the words of Henry 
Hart and Herbert Wechsler’s acknowledgment of Felix Frankfurter, “first opened [my mind] to 
these problems.”  See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at ix (1st ed. 1953).  The author acknowledges the invaluable suggestions 
on earlier drafts of this article from colleagues, practitioners, and my former students in Federal 
Courts. 
 1. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal district court judges in 
diversity cases must apply state substantive law rather than federal common law in deciding the 
case). 
 2. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
 3. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
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government.  These decisions have involved a clash between these two 
doctrines resulting in a weakening of Congress’s powers in order to protect the 
interests of the states. 
There have been many such decisions, typically decided by a 5-4 vote, 
addressing the question whether Congress may provide remedies to persons, 
usually state employees, for the state’s violation of federal law.  In the first of 
the modern cases, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,4 the Court struck down 
a provision of a federal statute that permitted the tribe to sue the state. The 
Court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment5 was a restriction on Congress’s 
power under Article I, Section Eight “to regulate Commerce . . . with the 
Indian Tribes.”6 And in Alden v. Maine,7 the Court held that the result is the 
same if Congress permits a suit against the state in state court for violation of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  There the ruling was based not on the 
Eleventh Amendment, which only applies to suits against the state in federal 
court, but on the doctrine of sovereign immunity—a doctrine that is inherent in 
the Constitution and that, like the Eleventh Amendment, prevents Congress 
from giving private parties8 a remedy against the state under Article I, section 
8.  The state is still obligated to obey the federal law; however, the law cannot 
be enforced by private individuals, unless the state consents to suit.9  Thus, in 
the area of the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, no court—state 
or federal—may give a remedy to plaintiffs in a suit against the state, even 
though there is a clear violation of federal law.10  The majority of today’s 
Court—albeit a bare majority—is more concerned about the infringement on 
state sovereignty occasioned by the federal statute than the loss of a remedy to 
individuals whose federal statutory rights have been violated. 
 
 4. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
 6. The one exception where a state may be sued by an individual pursuant to a statute 
enacted under Congress’s Article I, Section Eight power is the power to “establish . . . uniform 
laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”  See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. 
Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 7. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) 
 8. The Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity do not apply where the United States 
seeks to enforce the law. 
 9. The Court had previously held that the FLSA, when applied to the states, was an 
unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power under the Tenth Amendment in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1976), but Usery was overruled by Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 10. In general, injunctive and declaratory judgment relief may be obtained against a state 
official, but damages against the official are not permitted if the payment is going to come from 
the state.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). 
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Given its inability to provide a private remedy against the states despite its 
Article I, Section Eight power, Congress has relied on an alternative 
constitutional provision: its power to enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments.  (Most of the cases have involved the reach of Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, hence the term, “Section Five power.”)  
For the most part, the Court has invalidated these efforts on the grounds that 
Congress has the power only to enforce the amendments, not to enact 
substantive law that differs from what the Court has said violates the 
amendments.11  For example, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,12 state 
employees alleged age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).  The Court held that this portion of the 
ADEA was unconstitutional.  It contended that Congress was in effect making 
age discrimination a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, whereas the 
Court in previous decisions had held that age discrimination by the state, 
unlike race or gender discrimination, is not generally a violation of the 
Constitution.13 
Besides making it clear that only federal laws that are actual remedies for 
constitutional violations pass muster under the enforcement clauses, the Court 
has devised a test to determine what is a remedy: a remedy must be congruent 
and proportional to constitutional violations by the state.  This standard 
requires the Court to evaluate the kind of evidence presented to Congress.  The 
dissenting Justices view this requirement as inappropriate, because it puts the 
Court in the position of second-guessing a co-equal branch of government.14 
The difference between a decision like Boerne on Congress’s power under 
Section Five and a decision like Seminole Tribe that Congress has violated the 
 
 11. The most important case for the proposition that Congress under the Enforcement 
Clauses of the Civil Rights Amendments may only provide remedies for what the Court would 
find are violations of the substantive provisions of the Amendments is City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997), disapproving contrary language in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 
U.S. 641 (1966), that gave a broader reading to Congress’s enforcement power.  The latter case 
involved an issue of voting rights, an area in which the Court has traditionally deferred to 
Congress.  Whether today’s Court will continue to be so deferential will be determined in 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, probable jurisdiction noted, 
January 9, 2009, argued April 29, 2009.  Transcript of Oral Argument, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, No. 08-3222 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2009).  The question presented is “whether the 
appellant is eligible to ‘bail out’ from the preclearance requirement of Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, and whether Congress provided sufficient justification of current voting 
discrimination when it extended the requirement in 2006 for another twenty-five years.” 
 12. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–17 (1976). 
 14. It is also a topic that is of great interest to senators on the Judiciary Committee when 
they question Supreme Court nominees.  See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 549–645 (2005). 
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Eleventh Amendment by using its Article I, Section Eight powers is that in the 
former case, the law is invalid as far as it applies to the states; in the latter, the 
law still substantively regulates the states, but a private individual cannot sue 
the state for its violation.15 
While demonstrating its concern that the state itself not be sued by private 
individuals under federal statutes, the Court has been more willing to override 
federalism concerns by permitting Congress to override state laws through the 
doctrine of preemption.  This doctrine prevents the application of state law on 
the ground that federal law, either expressly or by implication, supersedes—or 
preempts—it.  For example, in the 2008 case of Rowe v. New Hampshire 
Motor Transport Ass’n,16 the Court held, 5-4, that the federal Motor Carrier 
Act of 198017 preempted a Maine statute regulating delivery of tobacco 
products.  But the preemption argument does not always prevail: in another 
2008 cigarette case from Maine, also a 5-4 decision,18 the Court held that 
federal cigarette labeling laws, which prohibited states from imposing health 
warnings on cigarette packaging, did not preempt a state law concerned with 
deceptive advertising.  Also favoring the preemption doctrine, the Bush 
Administration enacted approximately sixty regulations from 2006 to 2008 
preempting state laws in a variety of areas.19 
In all these developments, there are at least two common threads: Plaintiffs 
are deprived of remedies when the Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity, 
or federal preemption doctrines apply, and defendants, whether the state or 
corporations, benefit.  Similar trends favoring defendants in securities cases 
have been under way since 1995, both substantively and in terms of getting 
those cases out of state court and into federal court.  In the federal Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199520 (PSLRA), designed to prevent what 
 
 15. In Morrison, Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
non-economic criminal activity.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 618–19, 626–27 
(2000). 
 16. 552 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 989, 995–96 (2008). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793. 
 18. Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). 
 19. Jess Bravin, Altria Case Deals Blow to Efforts Reining in Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
16, 2008, at A1.  President Obama recently issued a memorandum reversing the Bush policy of 
unchecked preemption via agency regulations.  See Memorandum from President Barack Obama 
to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (May 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption/.  
The memorandum directs agencies to use preemption language in regulations “only when such 
statements have a sufficient legal basis,” and it further instructs agencies to review regulations 
promulgated in the past ten years to decide whether they meet this new standard.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court heard argument in a recent preemption case, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, on 
April 28, 2009.  Transcript of Oral Argument, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, No. 08-453 (U.S. 
Apr. 28, 2009). 
 20. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
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Congress felt were abuses in litigation brought under SEC Rule 10b-5 and 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, Congress made it more difficult 
for cases to proceed without more specific proof the Act was violated.  In the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 199821 (SLUSA), Congress 
preempted state law claims involving fraud in the purchase or sale of 
securities.  In a unanimous 2006 opinion, the Supreme Court extended the 
reach of this law to include preemption of state law claims that the person was 
induced to hold securities.22  And in the Class Action Fairness Act of 200523 
(CAFA), Congress changed the previous law on the removability of class 
action diversity cases to federal court, making it much easier for defendants to 
get their cases into federal court and out of state courts they perceive as 
plaintiff-friendly. 
The pro-defendant tilt has not been limited to federal statutory 
developments: As Justice Brennan noted in a 1977 law journal article, the 
Supreme Court has for many years been cutting back on an expansive reading 
of the constitutional protections concerning civil rights and liberties.24  This 
trend prompted Brennan to encourage plaintiffs to seek redress under state 
constitutional provisions rather than federal.  A similar shift has occurred in the 
area of federal habeas corpus.  Federal courts, once willing to hear habeas 
claims of state prisoners that their constitutional rights were violated in their 
state trial under Fay v. Noia,25 have been unwilling to do so under Wainwright 
v. Sykes.26  The majority and dissenting justices in Sykes engaged in heated 
debates on the propriety of denying any remedy to state habeas petitioners 
whose misfortune was to be represented by counsel whose mistakes prevented 
any court, state or federal, from ever hearing the petitioners’ constitutional 
defenses.27 
Consistent with these federal statutory and constitutional developments, 
the Court has largely abandoned the use of federal common law to imply 
remedies from federal statutes28 and the Constitution.29  There has been one 
 
 21. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227. 
 22. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. 
 24. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 25. 372 U.S. 391, 440–41 (1963). 
 26. 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977). 
 27. See id. at 113 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“Punishing a lawyer’s unintentional errors by 
closing the federal courthouse door to his client is both a senseless and misdirected method of 
deterring the slighting of state rules.”). 
 28. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433–35 (1964). 
 29. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971) (allowing recovery for damages upon proof of a violation of the Fourth Amendment), 
with Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies 
After Wilkie v. Robbins, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2006–2007, at 23 (Mark K. Moller 
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exception.  In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,30 the Court was willing to 
use federal common law to provide a defense to a state tort claim.  That case 
established for the first time the federal common law defense-contractor 
defense.  The dissenters accused the majority of favoring the interests of 
corporations over those of the victims of corporate negligence.31  The Court 
has demonstrated a recent unwillingness to read provisions of federal treaties 
to protect individual rights in state criminal cases—that is, unless the treaty 
itself explicitly states the provisions are to be self-executing.  Otherwise, the 
Court has said, Congress must pass legislation explicitly applying those 
protections to trials in the U.S. courts.32 
II.  ONLY IN AMERICA: A DUAL SYSTEM OF TRIAL COURTS 
From their previous law courses involving federal law, the students are 
somewhat aware of the developments discussed above.  They have not, 
however, addressed systematically a question that is prompted by these 
developments: what is the value of the United States having a dual system of 
trial and intermediate appellate courts, one state and one federal, while other 
countries have only one set of trial and appellate courts, with a constitutional 
court—the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court—to resolve finally the 
federal issues?33  From their first year Civil Procedure course, students are 
familiar with the problems of forum-shopping in the context of diversity 
jurisdiction in the years prior to Erie,34 when plaintiffs could game the system 
by choosing whichever court, state or federal, would use the more favorable 
law (state law or federal common law).  Erie, of course, was aimed at stopping 
this kind of forum-shopping by directing federal courts sitting in diversity to 
follow state substantive law rather than federal common law.  Much of the 
discussion in connection with Erie revolves around this question: When is the 
state law substantive, requiring the federal court to follow state law, and when 
is it procedural, permitting the federal court to follow federal law?35 
 
ed., 2007) (discussing the Court’s unwillingness to provide remedies for certain constitutional 
wrongs). 
 30. 487 U.S. 500, 504–06 (1988). 
 31. See id. at 530–31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 32. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356–57 (2008). 
 33. Another country with parallel lower state and federal courts is Switzerland.  See Fridolin 
M.R. Walther, The Swiss Legal System: A Guide for Foreign Researchers, 29 INT’L J. LEGAL 
INFO. 1, 5–6 (2001). 
 34. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938). 
 35. Compare Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (declaring that federal courts 
should apply state statute of limitations under outcome-determinative test), with Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1958) (noting that although the outcome 
might have been different if the case were tried in state court, plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial 
even though the judge would have been the fact-finder in state court).  The Federal Rules of 
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The existence of two sets of trial and appellate courts to hear federal 
questions presents similar problems: A state court may decide a federal 
question one way; the federal court across the street may decide it the other;36 
and until the Supreme Court resolves the conflict,37 there are two different 
judicial interpretations of the meaning of federal law within a state.38  So, to 
determine whether to apply state or federal procedure, should the outcome-
determinative test of Erie apply?  In Felder v. Casey,39 the Court held that a 
state’s notice-of-claim statute, which would have barred plaintiff’s § 1983 
claim, was preempted by federal law, which had no such provision and would 
thus have burdened federal rights.40  The Felder Court also referenced Erie, 
and some scholars have argued that such cases are examples of “reverse 
Erie.”41  Others, however, note the asymmetry of the two situations: State 
 
Evidence, not state rules, would apply to the admissibility of expert testimony.  See Brooks v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 999 F.2d 167, 173 (6th Cir. 1993) (addressing the applicability of FED. R. EVID. 
702–705).  In contrast the state rules of evidence would apply, not the federal rules, where the 
issues are presumptions, privileges, and competency of witnesses.  See FED. R. EVID. 302, 501, 
601. 
 36. Compare Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding a ban on long 
hair by the St. Charles County School District unconstitutional), with Kraus v. Bd. of Educ., 492 
S.W.2d 783, 786 (Mo. 1973) (holding that a school board may constitutionally regulate hair 
length).  In the most recently completed term of the Supreme Court, October 2007 Term, the 
Court issued opinions on the merits in sixty-seven cases, twelve of which came from the states.  
The Supreme Court 2007 Term—The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 525 (2008).  This is the 
lowest number of merits opinions since the October 1953 Term.  That means that most decisions 
by the lower courts, either state or federal, will not be reviewed, and thus most conflicting 
decisions on matters of federal law are left standing. 
 37. One of the three reasons set forth for granting certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court is a 
conflict on an important federal question between a state court of  last resort and a decision of a 
U.S. Court of Appeals or another state court of last resort.  SUP. CT. R. 10(b). 
 38. A federal habeas court may, in effect, reverse the decision of a state criminal court on 
matters of constitutional law, but the scope of federal habeas has narrowed in recent years.  See 
supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 39. 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 40. Id. at 141.  Two areas where state courts and federal courts may reach different results in 
federal question cases involve summary judgments and qualification of experts.  See supra note 
35.  Must state courts follow federal law in this area on the grounds that federal rights would 
thereby be burdened if the state law were followed?  The Supreme Court rejected that argument 
in Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997) and permitted the state court in a § 1983 case to apply 
its rule denying an interlocutory appeal by a state official from the denial of qualified immunity 
by the trial judge, id. at 922–23, despite the contrary rule that would apply were the case to have 
been heard in a federal court under Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308–09 (1996). 
 41. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: Reverse-Erie, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006). 
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courts must, under the Supremacy Clause, follow federal policy, whereas 
federal courts are under no such obligation to follow state law.42 
From their first-year Civil Procedure course, students will recall that 
federal courts have jurisdiction in diversity and federal question cases.  The 
students are surprised, however, to learn that although diversity jurisdiction 
existed from the very first Judiciary Act in 1789, there was no general federal 
question jurisdiction until after the Civil War.  Thus, during most of the first 
100 years of the existence of lower federal courts, there were only two ways 
federal questions could be heard in federal court—first, if there was a specific 
federal statute granting jurisdiction or second, if the federal claim arose in the 
context of a diversity case. 
Many students believe that cases involving federal statutes, such as 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, may be heard only 
in federal court, not in state court.  To the contrary, the presumption is that 
federal questions will be heard by state courts.  Only if Congress explicitly 
denies jurisdiction to state courts are they disabled from hearing such cases.43 
Students are also often surprised to learn that Article III does not require 
Congress to create the lower federal courts44—that the United States could 
have followed the practice of other countries of leaving the trial and initial 
appeal of federal questions, constitutional and statutory, to the equivalent of 
state courts.  After all, state officers take an oath to support the U.S. 
Constitution, and there is a separate obligation on state judges to follow federal 
 
 42. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 414–15 
(6th ed. 2009).  In Haywood v. Drown, the Court considered “[w]hether a state’s withdrawal of 
jurisdiction over certain . . . claims against state corrections employees—from state courts of 
general jurisdiction—may be constitutionally applied to exclude federal claims under Section 
1983 . . . when . . . the state legislature withdrew jurisdiction because it concluded that permitting 
such lawsuits is bad policy.”  See Brief for Respondents at i, Haywood v. Drown, No. 07-10374 
(U.S. Sept. 29, 2008).  The Court held that despite the State’s equal treatment of state and federal 
claims under the procedural rule at issue, the provision violated the Supremacy Clause because it 
was “contrary to Congress’ judgment that all persons who violate federal rights while acting 
under color of state law shall be held liable for damages.”   Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. ___, 
No. 07-10374, 2009 WL 1443136, at *1 (May 26, 2009).   
 43. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990) (“This deeply rooted presumption in 
favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction is, of course, rebutted if Congress affirmatively ousts 
the state courts of jurisdiction over a particular federal claim.”).  Even if state courts do not want 
to hear federal claims, they must do so, unless they have a valid excuse not to hear them.  See 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). 
 44. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366–67 (2001) (“Article III . . . leaves to Congress the 
decision whether to create lower federal courts at all.”).  Students are equally surprised to learn 
that state criminal prosecutions may take place in federal district court.  See, e.g., Tennessee v. 
Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 259, 271 (1879) (criminal prosecution of officer’s enforcing federal revenue 
law in state court removable to federal court).  The general removal statute now covers any 
federal officer raising a federal defense.  28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2006). 
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law, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”45 
I return to the question of why the United States has federal trial courts at 
the end of the course when we discuss federal question jurisdiction.  The 
specific question we consider then is whether there is such a doctrine as 
protective jurisdiction, by which federal courts are able to hear a case because 
it involves an entity, like the U.S. Bank,46 or a topic, like labor-management 
contracts,47 even though the substantive law to be applied is state law.  The 
students quickly see the need for federal jurisdiction.  They understand that 
state courts might be biased against a party (the U.S. Bank) or the subject 
matter (labor-management contracts), just as they might be biased against a 
party from another state, with this difference—diversity jurisdiction is 
explicitly mentioned in Article III as a basis for jurisdiction, but not so 
“protective jurisdiction.”  That leads to a discussion of whether Article III’s 
grant of jurisdiction for cases “arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties” is broad enough to encompass protective 
jurisdiction. 
Students who are asked why there should be lower federal courts typically 
respond by saying federal judges are less political than state judges and 
therefore can better render decisions based on the law rather than personal 
preferences.  Compared to state judges, who might be unwilling to rule against 
state political figures involved in future judicial re-election campaigns, federal 
judges, with life tenure and salary protection, are more likely to be willing to 
rule against state political figures.48  That leads to a discussion of how federal 
judges are appointed compared to state judges and an examination of the 
backgrounds of members of the state and federal judiciaries.49  Students are 
usually aware of the federal appointments process and may have heard about 
elections of state judges,50 but they are usually unaware of the non-partisan 
 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 46. See Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 47. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
 48. It is very unlikely state courts would get the opportunity to rule against federal officials 
because of the ability of the federal official to remove the case to federal court.  See supra note 44 
and accompanying text.  Even in the absence of a removal statute, the Supreme Court has 
prohibited state courts from taking jurisdiction against federal officials, at least in the context of a 
habeas corpus action where federal courts did have jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 397, 411 (1871) (“If a party thus held be illegally imprisoned it is for the courts or 
judicial officers of the United States, and those courts or officers alone, to grant him release.”). 
 49. To introduce students to this topic, I often invite federal judges to speak to my classes.  
In the Fall of 2008–2009 semester, Judge Duane Benton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit spoke to my Constitutional Law II class.  He had a unique perspective, having 
served for many years on the Supreme Court of Missouri prior to joining the Eighth Circuit. 
 50. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 526 U.S. 765 (2002), the Supreme Court 
held the First Amendment was violated by a state supreme court canon of judicial ethics that 
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court plans that limit the governor’s influence on the selection of judges.51  
Students are often surprised to learn that many federal judges have had 
significant political experience prior to joining the bench52—and that this is not 
necessarily a negative in terms of being a good judge.  Students are interested 
in lawyers’ preferences on the method of judicial selection: To the extent non-
partisan selection plans or electoral contests result in selection of judges 
favorable—or at least not unfavorable—to plaintiffs, those systems will be 
preferred by plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Defense lawyers, however, tend to prefer the 
federal appointments process, especially given the recent conservative 
appointees to the federal bench.  Some conservative lawyers are supportive of 
 
prohibited a judicial candidate running for office from “announc[ing] his or her views on disputed 
legal or political issues.”  In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., argued March 3, 2009, the Court 
faces the problem of financial contributions to a judge’s campaign and how that might influence a 
decision by the judge in a case coming before him.  See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 
33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 593 (Nov. 14, 2008).  
The question presented is “[w]hether a judge’s failure to recuse himself from a case in which he 
received substantial campaign donations from one of the parties violates the Due Process rights of 
the other party.”  Court to Rule on When Judges Must Recuse Themselves (Nov. 14, 2008), 
http://otd.oyez.org/articles/2008/11/18/court-rule-when-judges-must-recuse-themselves-nov-14-
2008; see Brief for Petitioners at I, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Dec. 29, 
2008). 
 51. Under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, the Governor appoints three members of the 
seven-person Appellate Judicial Commission, lawyers who are members of the Missouri Bar 
select three lawyers to the Commission, and the chair is the Chief Justice of the Missouri 
Supreme Court.  MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a)–(g).  The Commission sends three names to the 
Governor, who must select from the slate presented to him.  Id.  After serving for at least a year, 
the judge stands for retention at a non-contested election and must receive approval from a 
majority of the voters; thereafter, there is another retention vote after each term of office.  See id.  
Supreme Court and appellate judges are appointed under the Missouri Plan, whereas most trial 
judges run for election in these states, except in major metropolitan areas.  See id. 
 52. Until the 1980s,  they had often worked in some capacity for one of the U.S. senators in 
the state—on the senator’s staff or a fundraiser for senatorial campaigns—and senators played a 
major role in sending names of potential district court nominees to the President, especially when 
the President and the senator were from the same political party.  See NANCY SCHERER, SCORING 
POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
192–93 (2005).  However, beginning in the Reagan presidency, the judicial philosophy of the 
appointee has become the most important factor in nominating district court and court of appeals 
judges.  See id. at 160, 193–94.  Since the failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1987, judicial philosophy has come to be the predominant factor in nominating 
Supreme Court Justices.  See id. at 115. 
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efforts to elect judges.53  Other conservative groups have concluded the 
Missouri Plan is better for business than judicial elections.54 
Another justification for having the lower federal courts often given by 
students is that federal judges historically have been more sympathetic to 
claims of federal plaintiffs—particularly in cases involving civil rights and 
civil liberties—both in terms of finding of facts and interpreting federal law.  
Historically, the context for Congress’s giving federal courts general federal 
question jurisdiction was the Reconstruction era, when it was assumed state 
courts would not give a sympathetic hearing to claims brought by beneficiaries 
of the newly enacted civil rights laws.  Similar concerns prompted Congress to 
enact civil rights removal statutes55 as well as statutes permitting federal 
officials who are enforcing federal law to remove suits against them in state 
courts, both civil and criminal.56 
The issue of the federal judiciary’s sympathy to plaintiffs resurfaces when 
we discuss the constitutionality of federal legislation stripping federal courts of 
jurisdiction over certain substantive areas of law.  In arguing that such laws are 
unconstitutional, some scholars maintain that federal courts, because of their 
insulation from political control through the provisions of Article III, have a 
special role in constitutional interpretation that cannot be played by state 
courts.57  Assuming that was the case in Warren Court era of the 1960s, is it 
still true today? 
III.  FORUM SHOPPING: STATE VERSUS FEDERAL COURT 
It is at this point that the world of theory meets the world of practice.  And 
it is another reason why students find the course so interesting: Depending on 
the demographics of a particular community, plaintiffs’ lawyers may or may 
not prefer federal courts to state courts.  Among the myriad factors the 
plaintiff’s lawyer must weigh are: whether there is a right to a jury;58 the 
 
 53. See Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, The Federalist 
Society (Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/PubID.90/pub_detail.asp (“[D]efense 
lawyers should not be automatically seen as faithful protectors of the interests of businesses and 
consumers on the nominating commissions of Missouri Plan states.”). 
 54. See Joshua C. Hall & Russell S. Sobel, Is the “Missouri Plan” Good for Missouri? The 
Economics of Judicial Selection, Show-Me Institute Policy Study Number 15, at 1 (May 21, 
2008), available at http://showmeinstitute.org/docLib/20080515_smi_study_15.pdf (“Based on 
our analysis, Missouri’s current system is far superior to several of the alternatives.”). 
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2006). 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2006). 
 57. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term—Foreword:  
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). 
 58. In federal court, the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a right to a 
jury trial if the matter would have been tried to a jury at common law, but that amendment has not 
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demographics of the jury pool, including race59 and gender;60 the extent of voir 
dire;61 the ability of the plaintiff to get to the jury rather than having the case 
dismissed on summary judgment;62 the need for unanimity in getting a 
 
yet been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus a state is not required to provide 
a civil jury as a matter of federal constitutional law.  And it is not the case that plaintiffs always 
prefer a jury trial.  See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189 (1974).  In Curtis, the black plaintiff 
sued the white defendant for housing discrimination under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968 (Fair Housing Act).  42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).  The defendant sought a jury trial, but the 
plaintiff argued the case should be tried to the judge.  The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, held the defendant was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. 
 59. According to the 2000 census, the racial composition of St. Louis City residents 21 and 
over was 49% white, 45% black, and 6% Hispanic, Asian, Indian, or “Other.”  The Annual Jury 
Management Report indicated that for the 2007–2008 time period, the percentage of prospective 
jurors “summoned, qualified and available for impanelment” was 57% white, 41% black and 2% 
Hispanic, Asian, Indian or “Other.” Annual Jury Management Report, Office of the Jury 
Supervisor, July 1, 2007–June 30, 2008, at p. 4.  Statistics are not kept on the racial composition 
of a typical panel, but anecdotal evidence suggests that blacks are disproportionately struck—in 
criminal cases by the prosecutor who believes they cannot give a fair hearing to the state because 
of their distrust of police officers and in civil cases by defendants who believe blacks are pro-
plaintiff.  The percentage of blacks qualified as jurors on August 22, 2005 in the three divisions 
making up the Eastern District of Missouri compared to their percentage of the population in the 
divisions is as follows:  Eastern Division—10.33%/16.00%; Northern Division—1.33%/3.60%; 
Southeastern Division—1.00%/5.60%.  Report on Operation of the Jury Selection Plan, August 
22, 2005 (on file with publication).  As in the state system, there are no statistics kept by the court 
on the percentages of blacks on petit juries.  Race-based peremptory challenges of jurors have 
been held to be unconstitutional in the following situations: by prosecutors in criminal cases, 
Batson v. Kentucky,  476 U.S. 79 (1986); by a defendant in a criminal case, Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); and by litigants in civil cases, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).  In People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1992), a California appellate court held that Batson applies to a motion to disqualify a judge 
based on his race. 
 60. Concurring in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., a case in which the state used most of its 
peremptory challenges to strike males in the context of a paternity and child support case and 
which the Court disapproved, Justice O’Connor wrote: 
We know that, like race, gender matters. A plethora of studies make clear that in rape 
cases, for example, female jurors are somewhat more likely to vote to convict than male 
jurors.  Moreover, though there have been no similarly definitive studies regarding, for 
example, sexual harassment, child custody, or spousal or child abuse, one need not be a 
sexist to share the intuition that, in certain cases, a person’s gender and resulting life 
experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case. 
511 U.S. 127, 148–49 (O’Connor concurring) (citation omitted) (citing REID HASTIE, ET. AL., 
INSIDE THE JURY 140–41 (1983) (collecting and summarizing empirical studies)). 
 61. Lawyers typically have more involvement in voir dire in state courts than in federal 
courts, jury pools are usually larger than in federal courts and state judges are usually more 
willing to permit strikes of jurors for cause than are federal judges. 
 62. Compare the frequency of summary judgment in federal employment discrimination 
cases with the ease of getting to the jury in FELA cases under federal law.  Dice v. Akron Canton 
& Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] WHY LAW STUDENTS SHOULD TAKE THE FEDERAL COURTS COURSE 757 
verdict;63 and the perceived sympathy or lack thereof of the trial and appellate 
courts in the two systems.64  In some geographical areas, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
will avoid state courts, particularly where the community is hostile to the 
federal claims and judges are elected by an unsympathetic citizenry, or where 
the judges are unfamiliar with the subject matter of the case.  Similarly, 
defense counsel may seek out state courts, particularly specialized courts, such 
as Delaware’s Chancery Court that has developed an expertise in corporate law 
or Miami-Dade’s Business Division.65 
Federal employment discrimination cases have been analyzed in recent 
years, based on data from the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts.  A 2004 study indicated that such cases were the largest component of 
federal civil cases, 10% of the civil docket.  At all stages—pre-trial, trial, and 
appeal—plaintiffs in employment cases fared badly.66  A 2008 study indicates 
that these cases now make up just 6% of the district courts’ civil docket.  
Although in civil cases as a whole the affirmance rate by the U.S. courts of 
appeals is 80%, defendants in employment discrimination cases have a 41% 
chance of reversal and plaintiffs just a 9% chance of reversal.  That “might 
help to explain the last seven years’ drop of over 20% in plaintiffs’ bringing 
cases in the federal district courts.”67 
Given the reasons discussed above, it is not surprising that defendants 
generally want to remove their cases to federal court.  Under the general 
removal statute, defendants may remove to federal court “any civil action 
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 
 
 63. In the federal system, unanimity is required, in both civil and criminal cases; in many 
state civil trials, only a three-fourths verdict is required, and in some states, criminal cases may 
also be decided by non-unanimous votes.  See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).  Capital 
cases may require unanimity.  See Robbie Brown, In Georgia, Push to End Unanimity for 
Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at A14. 
 64. Charlie Savage, Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2008, at A1  (“Republican-appointed judges, most of them conservatives, are projected to make 
up about 62 percent of the bench next Inauguration Day, up from 50 percent when Mr. Bush took 
office. They control 10 of the 13 circuits, while judges appointed by Democrats have a dwindling 
majority on just one circuit.”).  The article notes that many of the judges appointed by President 
George W. Bush are young, hence they are likely to be on the bench for many years.  Id.  At the 
time President Obama took office, there were 13 vacancies on the U.S. Courts of Appeals (7.3%) 
and 42 vacancies on the U.S. District Courts (6.2%).  Vacancy Summary—110th Congress, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/cfapps/webnova/CF_FB_301/archived/summary01_01_09.html. 
 65. There are also specialized federal courts, for example, the Federal Circuit for patent 
appeals. 
 66. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Cases Fare 
in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) 
 67. Stewart J. Schwab & Kevin M. Clermont, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse? 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
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original jurisdiction.”68  Diversity cases may be removed only if none of the 
defendants are residents of the state in which the action is brought.69  As a 
result, plaintiffs’ lawyers in some federal districts will file employment 
discrimination cases under state law against the out-of-state company instead 
of seeking to bring their cases to federal courts.  They will attempt to defeat 
removal by adding a non-diverse party, such as the supervisor, who may be 
sued as a party under state employment discrimination laws.  In the general 
removal statute, Congress has prohibited the removal of cases from state to 
federal court in the following instances: Federal Employment Liability Act 
cases brought against a railroad ,70 state workers’ compensation cases,71 and 
civil cases brought under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.72  In 
addition to the general removal statute, Congress has prohibited removal in 
statutes governing specific areas of federal law.73  Clearly, if Congress were to 
determine that plaintiffs ought to have the final choice on where to file suits in 
other substantive areas, such as Title VII, it could make similar exceptions and 
prohibit removal. 
Typically, state courts will not have the support of law clerks to conduct 
legal research, whereas federal judges may rely on clerks to do extensive 
research.  This disparity may influence the decision on where to file (or 
whether to remove), especially in cases where legal issues are important.  
Litigating cases in federal court presents challenges not experienced in state 
court.  Federal judges are not, as a general rule, as accessible as in state court.  
Most motions are submitted in writing and not argued.  Hearings on qualifying 
experts to testify can take many days.74  The effort required for preparation of 
 
 68. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). 
 69. Id. § 1441(b).  In CAFA, supra note 23, Congress permitted removal where there is 
minimal diversity, that is, where one plaintiff and one defendant are from different states, thus 
making removal much easier in class actions covered under that statute. 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (2006).  Suits for less than $10,000 brought against common 
carriers are not removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b).  Most FELA cases filed by injured railroad 
workers around the country are filed in state court.  Interview with Jerome Schlichter, President, 
Academy of Rail Labor Attorneys in St. Louis, Mo. (Dec. 14, 2008). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (2006). 
 72. Id. § 1445(d). 
 73. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000) (dealing with cases under the Jones Act where a 
seaman or railworker is injured in the course of employment); Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 182 
F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1999); Alajoki v. Inland Steel Co., 635 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Mich. 1985); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a); but see 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2) (providing an exception for certain 
class actions that may be removed under SLUSA). 
 74. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Court held that 
the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) for admissibility of 
testimony by an expert had been rejected by Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  In General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Court limited the role of courts of appeals in reviewing 
the district courts’ decisions on whether or not to admit the testimony to an abuse of discretion 
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the pretrial order is extensive.  ADR, authorized by the Civil Justice Reform 
Act of 1990,75 adds costs to the parties, who must pay their own counsel as 
well as those of the mediator.76  These pretrial requirements encourage 
settlements—whether because they focus the parties on the strengths and 
weaknesses of their positions before trial or because they wear out one side or 
the other—and in the long run, may lower costs to the parties.77  But faced with 
these costs, a sole practitioner, especially when representing a client on a 
contingent fee, may avoid federal court altogether,78  inconsistent with 
 
standard.  And in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court held the 
Daubert standard applied to non-scientific expert testimony.  Although the Court in Daubert 
intended expert testimony to be more liberally admitted than it was under Frye, in fact, it has 
resulted in more limited use of expert testimony compared to state courts, typically to the 
disadvantage of the plaintiff.  Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho have now been codified in Federal 
Rules of Evidence 701, 702, and 703.  If the testimony of plaintiff’s expert is excluded on 
Daubert grounds, the consequence is likely to be the granting of defendant’s summary judgment 
motion, because that often means the plaintiff is unable to prove causation without an expert’s 
testimony.   In State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 
(Mo. banc 2003), the Missouri Supreme Court rejected both the Frye and Daubert standards in 
favor of the Missouri statute on expert testimony in civil cases, section 490.065 of the Revised 
Statutes of Missouri, which incorporates some of the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert 
testimony but rejects other parts.  Whether it will turn out to be more or less restrictive than 
Daubert is yet to be determined. 
  Another evidentiary area where different rules can influence a choice of forum is the 
admissibility of evidence on subsequent remedial measures in product liability cases, where states 
often do not follow the exclusionary rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 75. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.  This Act required each district court to implement 
a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, to include referring “appropriate cases to 
alternative dispute resolution programs . . . including mediation.” 28 U.S.C. § 473 (2006).  In its 
findings, Congress was concerned about the “cost and delay in civil litigation and its impact on 
access to the courts.”  Id. § 102.  In some districts, mediation is voluntary; in others, it may be 
imposed by the judge on the parties without consent. 
 76. In some districts, mediators serve pro bono. 
 77. Since 2003, the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has surveyed both 
parties and attorneys involved in mediation.  Most mediations in this district are voluntary.  Of 
the 612 attorney responses received as of January, 2009, 91% (540) indicated the benefits 
outweighed the costs.  Of the parties who responded, 86% (190) indicated the benefits 
outweighed the costs.  In terms of costs to the parties—out of pocket and attorneys fees (during 
this time period, the mediators in this district served pro bono)—59% of the attorneys estimated 
that the cost to their client was $2,500 or less, 21% estimated the costs were between $2500 and 
$5,000, 9% estimated costs were between $5,000 and $10,000, and 4% estimated the costs were 
over $10,000.  (Survey on file with author).  Of course, in a district where mediation is not 
voluntary, and where mediators’ fees must be paid by the parties, the surveys are likely to have 
different outcomes. 
 78. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court held that due process required 
a waiver of the filing and service of process fees in the context of divorce.  However, the Court 
upheld filing fees for bankruptcy in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).  In M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), the Court held that due process required the state to provide a record 
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Congress’s intent to control costs and increase access to the federal courts.  
These reasons may explain, in part, why the percentage of federal cases 
nationwide resolved by trial fell from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002.79 
CONCLUSION 
Federal Courts is a course that is both highly theoretical and quite practical 
for students.  Having taught it for over twenty years, I find it the most 
challenging course I teach—and the most rewarding.  Over the years, many 
returning graduates have told me that, to their surprise, the course proved quite 
helpful for many of the subject-matter areas covered on their bar examinations.  
And many former students have told me that it proved to be invaluable for 
their work in the federal courts—as law clerks, judges, or practitioners.  The 
question of why we have lower federal courts is worth raising anew, and the 
answers are likely to differ for each generation of law students. 
 
 
from the trial that resulted in termination of parental rights to enable her to appeal.  Since a 
plaintiff has the option of filing the federal claim in state court, it is unlikely there would be a due 
process problem, but if defendant removes, the cost issues discussed in text resurface. 
 79. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462–63 (2004). 
